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Mitigating the Employer’s Exposure to Third  
Party Claims of a Hostile Work Environment 
John A. Pearce II* and Ilya A. Lipin** 
I. INTRODUCTION
Romance in the workplace environment is common and may increase 
employers’ exposure to liability.  According to a recent survey, fifty-nine 
percent of employees admit to participating in a romantic relationship 
while at work.1  When asked what type of romance they participated in, 
forty-one percent stated that the romance was an ongoing but casual 
relationship and thirty-five percent stated that it was a spontaneous office 
hook-up.2  Based on their experiences, sixty-four percent stated that they 
would participate in the office romance again.3  However, even when the 
romantic relationship is consensual, the sexual nature of the office romance 
between employees may lead to litigation based on claims of sexual 
harassment.4   
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**Ilya A. Lipin is an attorney licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts. Mr. Lipin received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from Temple 
University School of Law, M.B.A. from Villanova School of Business in 2010 where he 
was a Graduate Business Fellow, LL.M. in Taxation from Villanova School of Law in 2008, 
J.D. from Thomas M. Cooley Law School in 2006, and B.A. from Drew University in 2003.
Mr. Lipin may be reached at ilya.a.lipin@gmail.com.
1. Office Romance Survey 2010, VAULT BLOGS, Feb. 12, 2010, http://blogs.vault.com/
blog/workplace-issues/office-romance-survey-2010/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC and FEPA Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcem 
ent/sexualharassment.cfm (stating that in 2010, 11,717 cases alleging sexual harassment and 
hostile work environment were filed with the EEOC.  The direct monetary benefits paid by 
companies to settle sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims through the 
EEOC have averaged $48.1 million annually for the past fourteen years).  See also Sara 
Bliss Kiser, Tyne Coley, Marsha Ford, & Erica Moore, Coffee, Tea, or Me? Romance and 
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 31 S. BUS.  REV. 35 (2006) (noting that the largest 
monetary payments—which are in addition to these amounts—are determined separately 
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“Third-party sexual harassment,” as these claims are called, occurs 
when employees are victims of either (1) an unreasonable interference in 
their work environment, or (2) an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
working environment.5  In 2014, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $1.45 
million to settle charges by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission on behalf of a group of sixteen female mortgage bankers.6  
The plaintiffs alleged that a “sexually hostile work environment” existed at 
the company.7  The sex discrimination lawsuit charged that the women 
faced “sexually charged behavior and comments from the supervisory staff 
and participating mortgage bankers, which resulted in a sexist and uncivil 
atmosphere.”8  The lawsuit also alleged that the female mortgage bankers 
who “didn’t embrace and participate in these circumstances became 
ostracized and suffered economic consequences by being deprived of 
lucrative sales calls, being deprived of training opportunities, and being 
denied other benefits of employment.”9  In addition to the cash payments, 
the bank agreed to revise its call data retention system record so that future 
sales calls can be analyzed to assure that they are more equally distributed 
among all mortgage bankers.10 
Although the frequency and severity of sexual harassment in the 
workplace is widely acknowledged and well documented, the legal 
community is only beginning to understand the impacts of workplace 
sexual harassment on third parties. One reason for this lack of 
understanding is due to the limited amount of cases that have been litigated 
in this area.11  A second reason is that a third party case is extremely 
through litigation or through arbitration that is commonly advocated by employers to reduce 
the corporate costs of litigation and to minimize public disclosures.  The U.S. Department of 
Labor reports that seventy-one percent of working women cope with some form of sexual 
harassment during their careers); Tiffani L. McDonough, Navigating Office Romances and 
Avoiding Litigation, 247 (30) THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 5, Feb. 13, 2013; Nolan C. Lickey, 
Gregory R. Berry & Karen S. Whelan-Berry, Responding to Workplace Romance: A 
Proactive and Pragmatic Approach, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY, 106 (2009); Maureen S. Binetti, 
Romance in the Workplace: When “Love” Becomes Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 153 (2007).
5. See Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. Mich. 2008).  See also Deb Lussier,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. and the Future of Title VII Sexual Harassment 
Jurisprudence, 39 B.C. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (1998); Jamie C. Chanin, What Is It Good For? 
Absolutely Nothing: Eliminating Disparate Treatment of Third Party Sexual Harassment 
and All Other Forms of Third Party Harassment, 33 PEPP. L.  REV., 385, 401–02 (2006). 
6. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Will Pay
$1,450,000 to Resolve EEOC Class Sex Discrimination Lawsuit, (Feb. 2, 2013), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-3-14.cfm. 
7. Saabira Chaudhuri, J.P. Morgan Agrees to Pay $1.45 Million to Settle Sex-
Discrimination Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304626804579362860949961116. 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Courts have found sexual favoritism to constitute a cause of action under Title VII in
the following four cases: Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988); Priest v. 
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difficult to prove because to prevail, the plaintiff must provide evidence of 
sexual harassment in the course of the litigation.12  In the realm of third-
party sexual harassment claims, plaintiff must prove that sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of sexual nature were so severe 
and pervasive that they affected and unreasonably interfered with an 
individual’s job performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or 
offensive working environment.13  
One developing trend in sexual harassment law is that of lawsuits 
initiated by third-party co-workers against the employer, based on 
consequences of workplace romance.  Courts recognize two forms of 
sexual harassment: a quid pro quo theory, or a hostile work environment 
theory.14  Quid pro quo third-party sexual harassment occurs where 
employees who are not personally harassed lose job benefits to other 
employees who are direct recipients of such harassment.15  Often referred 
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del. 
1983); and King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).   
12. See Cross v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 615 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir.
Iowa 2010) (noting that “[t]he standard for demonstrating a hostile work environment on the 
basis of sexual harassment is a demanding one.”).  See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, Jan. 12, 1990, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/currentissues.html (hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE N-915-050”) (noting that the EEOC’s 
Guidelines define two types of sexual harassment: “quid pro quo” and “hostile 
environment” and that “both types of sexual harassment are actionable under section 703 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), as forms of sex 
discrimination.”).  See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(a) (2004) (noting that EEOC Guidelines state, “[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a 
violation of section 703 of title VII.  Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment 
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”).  See 
also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (supporting the same).  
13. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 615 F.3d. at 981; EEOC NOTICE N-915-
050, supra note 12. 
14. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
15. See Liebovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y.
1998); Glen Gomes, James M. Owens, & James F. Morgan, The Paramour’s Advantage: 
Sexual Favoritism and Permissibly Unfair Discrimination, 18 EMPLOY. RESPONS. RIGHTS J. 73, 
77 (2006) (stating that “[i]n contrast to quid pro quo harassment, a hostile or abusive 
environment does not require the denial (or threat of denial) of any tangible job benefits; 
rather, the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment was viewed as negatively altering the 
conditions of employment (and thus was a form of discriminatory behavior.)”); C.M. Hunt, M. 
J. Davidson, S. L. Fielden & H. Hoel, Reviewing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace—an
Intervention Model, 39 PERSONNEL REV. 655, 657 (2010) (defining “quid pro quo” as sexual
harassment “where an individual will explicitly or implicitly makes sexual requests and/or
advances as an exchange for some desired result, for example a promotion”).
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to as a “something for something” claim,16 a classic quid pro quo case 
involves conditions of employment, where a manager offers an employee 
the option of performing a sexual act in order for the employee to achieve 
promotion or keep her job.  Conversely, the body of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment law is broader in nature and “comprises 
discriminatory comments, advances, touching, and the like that make the 
workplace ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive.’”17 Hostile work environment 
jurisprudence permits co-workers who are surrounded by an unwelcomed 
sexually charged atmosphere to sue the employer for creating or allowing 
an abusive working environment.18   
The quid pro quo and hostile work environment theories are not in a 
strict dichotomy, and may complement each other.  For instance, quid pro 
quo harassment can contribute to a hostile work environment.19  In this 
situation, the employer will base employment decisions affecting the 
employee on the whether the employee will tolerate or reject the 
employer’s conduct.20  That is, quid pro quo harassment can exacerbate the 
hostile work environment if a supervisor exceeds his authority in a hiring 
process by causing someone to tolerate or partake in a sexual act.21  
This Article consists of five parts that provide an in-depth overview of 
third-party hostile work environment claims and recommend solutions that 
employers may utilize to safeguard their employees and decrease risks 
associated with costly litigation.  
After the introduction in Part I of this article, Part II defines and 
describes the origins of hostile work environment claims.  Part III presents 
specific theories that employees may rely upon to allege third-party hostile 
environment claims against their employer.  Isolated events may not be 
actionable, but under the sexual favoritism theory of hostile work 
environment claims, plaintiffs have been successful in proving cases based 
upon both systematic and individualized quid pro quo sexual favoritism. 
Recovery may be obtained under traditional hostile work environment 
theory where the employee, although not subject to direct harassment, must 
work in an atmosphere where the harassment is endemic and severe. 
Further, under the emerging sex-plus theory, a plaintiff may seek recovery 
where gender discrimination occurs in combination with discrimination 
against an additional characteristic, such as personal relationship status, 
marital status, pregnancy or fertility, or familial status.   
16. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 532 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997) (“The term
quid pro quo literally means ‘something for something.’”). 
17. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 307, 308 (1998).
18. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).
20. Id.
21. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
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Part IV recommends solutions that employers can implement in order 
to prevent hostile work environments from arising at their company.  Part 
V concludes this article and makes predictions on the future of the third-
party hostile environment claims moving forward.   
II. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW
Hostile work environment law has been evolving and growing for 
nearly fifty years, based upon a complex combination of statutory law, 
regulations, and case law.  A party prosecuting or defending against a third-
party hostile work environment claim will benefit from understanding the 
law’s development and the current legal requirements.  
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW
The origin of hostile work environment law is found in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it “an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”22  Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations provide additional 
guidance and interpreted Title VII to protect against unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature when “such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”23  Further, 
EEOC regulations provided that “where employment opportunities or 
benefits are granted because of an individual’s submission to the 
employer’s sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer 
may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons 
who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity. . . .”24  
State laws, such as California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act 
(“FEHA”) and Washington’s Law against Discrimination (“WLAD”), 
afford additional protection for employees against hostile work 
environments.25   
22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2004).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (2004).
25. Under FEHA, an employee may establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment
by demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter 
his or her working conditions and create a hostile working environment.  See California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900, et seq. (West 2015) (noting that 
California law recognizes that sexual harassment occurs when a sexual relationship between 
a supervisor and a subordinate is based upon quid pro quo; the law protects employees 
against an employer’s retaliation in the event that the employee files a complaint or protests 
conduct prohibited by FEHA). 
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On a case-by-case basis, courts have clarified the definition of hostile 
work environment and the doctrine’s applicability to employer-employee 
relationships.  In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court 
for the first time expressly recognized that Title VII prohibits sexual 
harassment that creates a hostile work environment.26  In Meritor, a female 
bank employee brought a claim against her supervisor and employer 
alleging that she was sexually harassed during her four-year period by her 
supervisor, which created an unwelcomed offensive and hostile work 
environment in violation of Title VII.27  At the district court level, the 
plaintiff provided testimony that her supervisor invited her out to dinner 
and suggested to have sexual relations with him at the hotel.28  Although 
she has initially refused, the plaintiff has ascended to the advances because 
she was afraid to lose her job.  The plaintiff testified that she had 
intercourse with her supervisor “some 40 to 50 times,” was fondled in front 
of her co-workers, was raped in the bathroom, and that her supervisor 
would expose himself in front of her.29  The plaintiff also alleged that the 
supervisor fondled other female bank employees.30  Since the plaintiff was 
afraid of the consequences of filing a complaint and her supervisor, she has 
never reported this harassment or followed employer’s complaint 
procedures.  Conversely, the supervisor denied these allegations and 
contended that the allegations were made because of a business-related 
dispute.31  
The Supreme Court analyzed the Title VII and EEOC regulations 
pertaining to sexual harassment and hostile environment. The Court 
concluded based on evidence presented that the plaintiff’s claim of hostile 
work environment was actionable under Title VII.32  The Court stated that 
Title VII “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”33  The 
phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” contained in Title 
VII evidences Congress’s intent to “strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women in the employment,” which includes 
requiring employees to work in hostile and abusive environments.34  Thus, 
the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with 
26. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 60–61.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66, 73. (The Supreme Court noted that the EEOC
Guidelines state that Title VII is meant to be interpreted to afford “employees the right to work 
in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”  Further, the 
Supreme Courted noted that “[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based 
on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited.  The Guidelines thus 
appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the existing case law.”). 
33. Id. at 64.
34. Id. at 65.
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‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 
create an abusive working environment,’ Title VII is violated.”35 
In a subsequent case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court 
further defined and established standards to for evaluating the scope of 
hostile work environment.36  In Harris, a female manager filed a suit 
against her employer, an equipment rental company, claiming that behavior 
of her male supervisor who was the company’s president created “an 
abusive work environment for her because of her gender.”37  Specifically, 
the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made her “the target of unwanted 
sexual innuendos” in the presence of her co-workers, suggested a trip to 
Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise, asked to get coins out of his pockets, 
threw objects on the ground and asked the plaintiff to pick them up, and 
made sexual comments about the plaintiff’s clothing.38  The District and the 
Appeals courts held that the supervisor’s behavior did not reach a level of 
severity that would affect plaintiff psychologically.39   This behavior did 
not create a hostile work environment for the plaintiff, even though the 
supervisor’s comments would offend a reasonable woman.40  
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, stating that to determine 
whether harassment in the workplace results in a hostile work environment 
one should look at the totality of circumstances and consider the frequency 
and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct is physical, threatening, 
humiliating, or merely offensive, and whether the conduct “unreasonably 
interferes with employee’s work performance.”41  The Supreme Court 
noted there is no clear boundary when harassment creates a hostile work 
environment and becomes actionable.  Title VII applies when such 
behavior may affect employee’s job performance, discourage remaining at 
the job, or keep from advancing in the career.42  In this case, it was 
sufficiently hostile that the employee had a nervous breakdown as a result 
of the harassment at work. 
Although not anticipated at the time, both Meritor and Harris provide 
guidance for the hostile work environment law’s recent expansion to third-
35. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67).
36. Id. at 20 (stating that the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve a conflict
among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as ‘abusive work environment’ 
harassment . . . must ‘seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or lead the 
plaintiff to ‘suffer injury.’”).  
37. Id. at 19.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 19–20.
40. Id.
41. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (“The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment 
abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into 
account, no single factor is required.”). 
42. Id. at 22.
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party claims.  Both decisions remain relevant in showing that Title VII 
intended to protect against hostile work environment claims, including 
those currently brought by third-party litigants.  Last, the holdings and the 
underlying analysis in Meritor and Harris provides for the roadmap the 
courts should use today in evaluating hostile work environment claims 
brought by a third party.43  
B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW TODAY
The term “hostile work environment” has evolved to describe a
workplace atmosphere in which offensive, hostile, abusive conduct is 
common,44 or in which management or coworkers exhibit favoritism towards 
certain employees at the expense of others45 caused by management46 or 
coworkers.47  In general, to prove a third-party hostile work environment 
harassment claim, an employee must prove all of five elements: (1) that he or 
she meets a definition of an “employee” as defined by Title VII; (2) that the 
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature; 
(3) that the harassment was based on the sex of the employee;48 (4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment; and (5) that the harassment is imputable to the employer.49
Courts have provided additional guidance for these five elements.
43. See discussion infra Part III (discussing hostile work environment law as it pertains to
third-party claimants). 
44. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
45. See Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626 (1996).  See Miller v. Dept. of
Corrections, 36 Cal. 4th 446 (Cal. 2005) (discussing favoritism). 
46. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 451.
47. See Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp., 568 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2009).
See also C.M. Hunt, et al., supra note 15, at 657 (defining hostile work environment as 
“sex-related behaviours which make the victim feel uncomfortable . . . thus producing a 
hostile work environment.”).  See also Brady Coleman, Introduction to the Symposium on 
Workplace Bullying: Pragmatism’s Insult: The Growing Interdisciplinary Challenge to 
American Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTS. & POL’Y J. 239, 248 (2004) (defining 
hostile work environment as “conduct of a sexual nature [that] creates an intimidating or 
abusive work environment”); Alana C. Brown, Ninth Annual Review of Gender and 
Sexuality Law: Education Law Chapter: Sexual Harassment in Education, 9 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 813, 832 n. 25 (“A hostile work environment, in sexual harassment law, is a 
workplace where an employee, although not denied promotions or other privileges, is 
treated badly based on a trait protected by Title VII, such as race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”). 
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004) (stating that “[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a
violation of section 703 of title VII.”).  See also EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12 
(supporting the same).  See also Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action 
For Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 591 (1994) (noting that to have a 
viable Title VII claim “it still is necessary for the plaintiff to have been disadvantaged 
because of his or her own gender”). 
49. See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012).
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1. Element One: “Employee” Defined
The first element requires the plaintiff to be an employee as defined by
Title VII.  The term “employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an 
employer.”50  The definition specifically excludes any individuals elected to 
public office and its appointees, but not employees subject to civil service 
laws of state government agency, or political subdivisions.51  Thus, if the 
plaintiff is not an employee as defined by the statute, he or she will not be 
protected under this law.52  The law applies to all employees and does not 
distinguish between managers and other subordinate employees.53  
2. Element Two: Unwelcome
The second element requires the plaintiff to have been subjected to
some form of sexual harassment.  This harassment has to be unwelcomed.54  
The court has defined the term “unwelcomed sexual harassment” as 
“sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome in the sense that it is 
unsolicited or unincited and is undesirable or offensive to the employee.”55 
3. Element Three: Gender-Based
The third element requires that the sexual harassment be based on the
sex of the employee.  Here, the plaintiff must show that but for the 
employee’s gender, he or she would not have been sexually harassed,56 or 
stated differently, that the “harassment was gender-based.”57  To prove this 
element, the plaintiff should present evidence that “members of one sex are 
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which 
members of the other sex are not exposed.”58  If plaintiff fails to present 
evidence of “some gender-based animus,” the claim may be denied even if 
the comments made toward the aggrieved party were sexual in nature.59 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2010).
51. Id.
52. Id.  See also Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. 2003) (noting that if the
plaintiff is an employee, he or she meets the requirement imposed by the first element). 
53. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the equal
application of the law to all employees). 
54. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding
that sexual harassment has to be unwelcomed to be actionable). 
55. Frensley v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 440 F.App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
Marquez v. Voicestream Wireless Corp., 115 F.App’x 699, 701 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  See also Bruno v. Monroe County, 383 F.App’x 845, 847 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that unwanted sexual conduct includes “sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature.”). 
56. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2011).
57. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 470.
58. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (internal quotations
omitted). 
59. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 473.
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Claims may be brought in cases of same-sex harassment, i.e., 
harassment between individuals of the same gender.60  In same-sex cases, 
the plaintiff may establish the third element by: “(1) showing that the 
harasser making sexual advances acted out of a sexual desire; (2) showing 
that the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the presence of men 
[or women] in the workplace; or (3) offering direct comparative evidence 
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-
sex workplace.”61  In the same-sex harassment claim, sexual orientation of 
the parties is irrelevant.62  Thus, a same-sex harassment claim may exist in 
circumstances with the heterosexual or homosexual parties.  
4. Element Four: Severe or Pervasive
The fourth element requires that behaviors creating a hostile work
environment be sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere unreasonably 
with an employee’s job performance.63  Courts have developed a test that 
includes two components, both of which the plaintiff must satisfy to 
prevail.64 
a. Subjective Component
Under the first, subjective component, the employee must show that 
sexual harassment was severe enough to change the conditions of 
employment, i.e., to create a hostile working environment.65   To reach a 
sufficient level of severity, the employer’s conduct must be continuous and 
may not be isolated or trivial,66 but sexual advances by the employer on the 
60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80 (noting that “Title VII prohibits ‘discrimination. . .
because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment.  Our holding that this 
includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the 
statutory requirements.”). 
61. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 471 (citing Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th
Cir. 2006)) (internal citations omitted). 
62. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75 (holding that Title VII applies to sexual discrimination
consisting of harassment between members of the same gender).  See also Melnychenko v. 
84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285 (1997) (discussing same-sex harassment claims); Smith v. 
Brimfield Precision, Inc., 1995 Mass. Comm. Discrim. LEXIS 7 (1995) (discussing same).   
63. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.  See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638 (U.S. 2007) (stating that a hostile work environment claim 
“comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which ‘may not be actionable on its own’ 
. . .  [and] ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day.’  In other words, the actionable 
wrong is the environment, not the individual acts that, taken together, create the 
environment.”) (citations omitted).  
64. Smith v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 F.App’x. 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 799.
66. Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626, 1631 (1996) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989)).  See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N POLICY STATEMENT NO. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc. 
gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (stating that “[a]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a 
‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against 
women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than 
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plaintiff are not required.67  As part of the claim, plaintiffs are not required 
to prove any physical manifestations of the harm.68  
Whether the sexual harassment was severe enough to change the 
conditions of employment is a question of fact and is determined on a case-
by-case basis.69   For example, in Blakey v. Continental Airlines, a female 
pilot successfully sued an employer airline for creating a hostile work 
environment after pornographic pictures of her were posted in the cockpits 
of the aircraft, coworkers and managers made obscene and harassing 
comments about her, and the employer failed to take appropriate actions to 
remedy the situation.70  The airline filed for summary judgment on the 
hostile work environment claim, but the court denied the motion.  They 
found that a dispute of fact existed, and the airline had a duty to act to 
prevent harassment of its employees.71  
There are, however, multiple cases where the courts have held that 
inappropriate conduct did not rise to the level of severity to create a hostile 
work environment.  For instance, in Webb-Edwards v. Orange County 
Sheriff’s Office, the court held that a supervisor’s comments about the 
plaintiff’s body shape and her attractive appearance, and his request that 
she wear tighter clothing, did not constitute a hostile work environment.72  
Similarly, in another case, Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., the court held 
that no hostile work environment claim existed where the manager called 
his subordinate a “pretty girl,” commented that “there’s always a pretty girl 
giving me something to sign off on,” made “a grunting sound” at the 
plaintiff who wearing a leather skirt, commented on “how hot” the 
subordinate was, and stated that “all pretty girls should run around naked” 
in the office.73 
b.  Objective Component 
Under the second, objective component, the hostility of the working 
environment is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances from 
the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.74  This 
their genders.”).  See also Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 
1984) (noting that Title VII does not serve “as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights 
suffered by the hypertensive”).  
67. See Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1414 (1993).
68. See Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1089 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bye, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the physical manifestation requirement of the fourth element). 
69. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Mitigating Legal Risks Using Social Media,
INFO. MGMT. J., Sep./Oct. 2011, at HT 10 (discussing factual and legal interpretation 
dispute); Harris, 510 U.S. at 17, 21–23 (noting factual determination); Pucino v. Verizon 
Commc’ns., Inc., 618 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment motion and 
allowing hostile work environment claim to proceed). 
70. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 992 F. Supp. 731, 733 (D.N.J. 1998).
71. Id. at 739.
72. Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1027 (11th Cir. 2008). 
73. Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
74. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
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view may be based on the plaintiff’s gender, i.e., would a reasonable 
person of the same gender in the plaintiff’s circumstances find the sexual 
harassment to be abusive or hostile enough to create a hostile work 
environment.75  This reasonableness standard considers the defendant’s 
behavior from the plaintiff’s perspective.76  
The courts may rely on the following list of factors in determining if 
the objective component is met:77  
(1) The frequency and the severity of the conduct;
(2) “Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance;
(3) “Whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the
employee’s job performance;”78
(4) “The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being;”79
(5) Social context, the surrounding circumstances, relationships,
and the worker’s expectations;80
(6) “The general work atmosphere, involving employees other than
the plaintiff;”81
(7) “Whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor;
(8) “Whether . . . others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and
(9) “Whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual.”82
In applying these tests, the courts have reached several determinations 
regarding conduct that is not sufficiently severed.  For example, by itself, a 
co-worker’s romantic involvement with a supervisor does not create a 
hostile work environment.83  For another, sexual flirtation or innuendo, or 
vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, does not establish a 
hostile work environment.84  However, unequal treatment of employees, 
combined with sexually explicit behaviors by the employer, may be 
75. See Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F.App’x. 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2010).
76. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
77. See Reeves v. DSI Sec. Servs., Inc., 395 F.App’x. 544, 546 (11th Cir. 2010).
78. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.  See Reeves, 395 F.App’x. at 546 (discussing factors needed
to show that sexual harassment was objectively severe).  
79. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
80. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 72 (1998) (discussing the totality of circumstances).
81. See Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 610.
82. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
83. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.  See also Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc.,
229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. P.R. 2000) (“The workplace is not a cocoon, and those who labor 
in it are expected to have reasonably thick skins—thick enough, at least, to survive the 
ordinary slings and arrows that workers routinely encounter in a hard, cold world.”). 
 Summer 2015] MITIGATING THE EMPLOYER’S EXPOSURE 331 
actionable.85  Manifestations of an alleged affair between the employer and 
employee, such as sexual horseplay in the office to an egregious and/or 
frequent degree, or preferential treatment of the co-worker that prevents a 
co-worker/plaintiff from being evaluated on grounds other than his or her 
sexuality, help to establish a work situation that may be actionable.86   
5. Element Five: Employer Liability
Finally, the fifth element requires the plaintiff employee to prove a
basis for employer liability.87  The third-party plaintiff must provide 
evidence that the employer “knew or should have known” that the 
harassment occurred, but “failed to take prompt and effective remedial 
action.”88  One of the means to show employer’s knowledge is for 
employee to provide proof that notice was given to the employer regarding 
the behavior that is believed to have created a hostile work environment.89  
There are circumstances where the plaintiff does not have a reasonable 
avenue to complain and provide notice to an employer.  For instance, such 
circumstances may exist where an employer does not provide a reasonable 
avenue of complaint or employee was afraid to give such notice due to 
possibility of retaliation or harm.  Thus, employer may still have exposure 
to legal liability if it had knowledge or could have known through an 
exercise of reasonable care about the harassment but failed to take 
appropriate remedial action.90  To show knowledge under this alternative 
standard, the plaintiff must show that “(1) someone had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the harassment, (2) the knowledge of this 
individual can be imputed to the employer, and (3) the employer’s 
response, in light of that knowledge, was unreasonable.”91  
To establish that the employer has failed to act, the employee must 
provide evidence that he or she took advantage of corrective opportunities 
85. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1269.
86. Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1374–75 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
87. See Smith v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 Fed. App’x. 797, 801 (11th Cir.  2011).
Some cases use this analysis as a sixth element, having separated the severe or pervasive, 
and subjectively and objectively unreasonable tests into two elements, but the language is 
very similar and the tests are generally used interchangeably by courts.  See, e.g., Pérez-
Cordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2011) (identifying and analyzing 
six elements, including (4) severe or pervasive; (5) objectively and subjectively 
unreasonable; and (6) employer liability).  
88. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc, 622 F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2010).  See also Blackmon v. Wal-
Mart Stores East, L.P., 358 F.App’x. 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing and quoting Miller v. 
Kenworth of Dothan Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “when the 
perpetrator of the harassment is merely a co-employee of the victim, the employer is liable 
only ‘if it knew or should have known of the harassing conduct but failed to take prompt 
remedial action.’”). 
89. See Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing that the employee
should provide notice about questionable behavior that is believed to have created a hostile 
work environment).   
90. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
91. Duch, 588 F.3d at 763.
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provided by the employer, such as timely providing notice to the proper 
authorities within the company and acting as prescribed by the employee 
handbook.92  The employee has a duty to take reasonable action to avoid 
harm, and thus mitigate damages.93  To avoid liability, the employer’s 
response to the employee’s notice regarding sexual harassment must not be 
indifferent or “indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to 
discrimination.”94  
III. THIRD-PARTY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
Within the framework of a hostile work environment, a third party,
commonly a co-worker of the employee romantically involved with or 
harassed by a supervisor, may sue the employer.  The third party may 
litigate such a claim under either the favoritism95 or third-party sexual 
harassment theories.96  
A. FAVORITISM
Favoritism takes three forms: (1) isolated instances toward an
employee paramour, (2) favoritism based on coerced sexual conduct, and 
(3) widespread favoritism.97  The first two forms, isolated instances of
favoritism or favoritism based on coerced sexual conduct toward a
paramour, are unlikely to provide recovery for a third-party plaintiff.  Only
sexual harassment that is based on widespread favoritism is recognized by
the EEOC Policy Guidance,98 which is often followed by state and federal
courts in deciding whether a hostile work environment exists.99
Accordingly, this Article will show that widespread favoritism can be a
basis by which third-party plaintiffs may successfully pursue litigation.
An employer’s sexual favoritism or preferential treatment may create a 
hostile work environment when conducted in an indiscreet manner, causing 
92. May v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 374 F.App’x. 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2010) (describing
evidence employee should provide to prove employer’s failure to act after the notice was given). 
93. See Agusty-Reyes v. Dep’t of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that employee 
must reasonably try to avoid harm and an employee’s failure to do so constitutes an affirmative 
defense for the employer). 
94. See West v. Tyson Foods, 374 F.App’x 624, 632 (6th Cir. 2010) (“When an employer
implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII only if 
that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that 
amounts to discrimination.”).  
95. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 451.
96. See Liebovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d. at 144.
97. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
98. Id. (citing Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278) (noting that the EEOC denies that third
party claims are actionable in cases of isolated sexual harassment). 
99. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63 (referencing EEOC definitions and guidelines).
See also Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1626; Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 446; Broderick, 685 F. 
Supp. at 1269 (supporting the same proposition). 
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plaintiffs to believe that favorable treatment may be obtained from the 
employer in exchange for a romantic or sexual relationship,100  Co-workers 
of an employee engaged in a relationship with a superior may perceive that 
the person in power favors that employee, and thus raise allegations of the 
existence of the hostile work environment.101  Under third-party sexual 
harassment doctrine, this favoritism occurs when a supervisor in such a 
relationship awards benefits to the employee with whom he or she is 
having a personal relationship, thereby denying the benefits to similarly 
qualified third-party employees.102  For the claim to succeed, the employee 
must be qualified for the job.103  Consistently, EEOC regulations define 
favoritism as a situation “where employment opportunities or benefits are 
granted because of an individual’s submission to the employer’s sexual 
advances or requests for sexual favors . . . .”104  Additionally according to 
the regulations, an employer may be liable for unlawful sex discrimination 
against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment 
opportunity or benefit.105   
1. Isolated Instances of Favoritism toward a Paramour
The first category of favoritism involves isolated instances of
favoritism toward a paramour.106  According to the EEOC, an isolated 
instance of preferential treatment based on consensual romantic 
relationships does not violate Title VII.107  Thus, for example, a female 
100. Miller, 36 Cal. at 451, 465 (citing Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1629–30) (The court in
dictum suggested that “sexual favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it leads
employees to believe that ‘they [can] obtain favorable treatment from [the manager] if they
became romantically involved with him’. . . the affair is conducted in a manner ‘so
indiscreet as to create a hostile work environment,’ or the manager has engaged in ‘other
pervasive conduct . . . which created a hostile work environment.’”).
101. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 468; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (2004).
102. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N NOTICE NO. N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docsfsexualfavor.html (hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE N-915.048”)
(noting that the EEOC Policy Guidance defines sexual favoritism as discrimination “against
individuals who are qualified for but are denied an employment opportunity or benefit, where
the individual who is granted the opportunity or benefit received it because that person
submitted to sexual advances or requests.”); see Phillips, supra note 48, at 549, (stating that
“[i]n the typical sexual favoritism (or ‘paramour’) claim, the plaintiff alleges that her employer
has violated Title VII by favoring another employee (the paramour) due to a sexual or
romantic relationship between a supervisor and the paramour.”).
103. Phillips, supra note 48, at 556 (noting that in example, EEOC has stated that the
charging party, plaintiff, must be qualified for a job from which he or she was denied due to
the widespread favoritism).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
107. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
It is the Commission’s position that Title VII does not prohibit instances of
preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships. An
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plaintiff who is denied an employment benefit because her supervisor 
awards it to his paramour would not have a viable Title VII claim based on 
this single, isolated instance of sexual favoritism.108   
Courts tend to agree with the EEOC’s assessment of single instances. 
At least one case suggests that a plaintiff’s allegation of the existence of a 
hostile work environment must be substantiated by a pattern of repeated, 
routine, or generalized level of harassing behavior by the defendant.109  
Because of the difficulties inherent in providing these types of evidence, 
plaintiffs usually fail to prove the existence of a hostile work environment. 
For instance, in Proksel v. Gattis, a female plaintiff worked as a 
personal secretary and office manager for a male defendant attorney.110  
During the time of plaintiff’s employment, the defendant hired another 
female employee, Burton, to work full-time as a word processor.  The 
plaintiff noticed events that led her to believe that the defendant was 
romantically interested in Burton.  The plaintiff stated that she observed the 
defendant employer looking down Burton’s low-cut blouse, following her 
movements as she left the premises, and blowing her kisses across the 
office.111  Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and Burton 
attended a private birthday lunch and had “clandestine meetings” in and out 
of the office.112  The plaintiff stated that she overheard the defendant telling 
Burton during the company Christmas party that she was beautiful.113  
Finally, the plaintiff stated that the defendant gave Burton a Christmas gift 
and a larger year-end bonus than any other employee.114  Plaintiff’s 
employment was terminated after she reported the behaviors she observed 
to the defendant’s wife.115  
isolated instance of favoritism towards a ‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a 
friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men in 
violation of Title VII, since both a disadvantaged for reasons other than their 
genders.  A female charging party who is denied an employment benefit 
because of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated more 
favorably had she been a man, nor conversely, was she treated less favorably 
because she was a woman. 
EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.  See Proksel, 41 Cal. App. at 1630 (stating, 
“where . . . there is no conduct other than favoritism towards paramour, the overwhelming 
weight of authority holds that no claim of sexual harassment or discrimination exists.”). 
108. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12 (noting that a “a female charging party
who is denied an employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not have
been treated more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated less
favorably because she was a woman.”); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679 F. Supp.
495, 499 (W.D. Pa. 1988); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626, 1630 n. 5 (1996) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989)).
110. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1628.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The majority of the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed by the trial 
court.116  Then, during the trial for breach of the implied promise that she 
would not be terminated except for good cause, the jury found that plaintiff 
was an at-will employee and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.117  
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting 
summary adjudication as to her statutory and common law claims of sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment based on FEHA and the public policy 
of the state.118   
The appellate court disagreed and upheld the lower court’s decision, 
holding that there was insufficient evidence presented of sexual harassment or 
hostile work environment because the plaintiff produced proof only of isolated 
instances of favoritism towards the defendant.119  The plaintiff must show a 
“concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature 
by the defendant.”120  According to the court, the defendant’s flattering 
remarks about the new coworker, his favoritism towards her, and the kiss she 
blew at him did not meet the required standard for recovery.121   
The Proksel decision thus reinforces that a plaintiff’s recovery depends on 
an ability to provide evidence of a “repeated, routine, or generalized” level of 
egregious or frequent romantic behavior between a superior and a subordinate 
co-worker.122  Isolated instances, even when they raise the inference of 
favoritism to the paramour in the office setting, per Proksel decision are not 
enough for a third-party claimant to succeed.  Under Title VII and Proksel 
decision isolated favoritism towards a paramour, although may be unfair, 
“does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title VII, since 
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.”123 
2. Favoritism Based on Coerced Sexual Conduct
A second category of sexual favoritism, coerced sexual conduct, is
also known as quid pro quo sexual harassment.  It is actionable under 
116. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1629 (noting that the plaintiff alleged causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and
deceit, sex discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  On
summary judgment, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and public policy
causes of action.  Following the plaintiff’s opening statements, the defendant’s motion for
non-suit was granted as to the plaintiff’s fraud and deceit cause of action.  The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant acted in bad faith as redundant, and only
allowed the plaintiff to pursue her claim for breach of an implied promise that she would not
be terminated except for good cause.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1630 n. 5.
121. Id. at 1631.
122. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1631.  See also Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214
Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989); Downes v. F.A.A., 775 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(abrogated on other grounds); Harris, 510 U.S. 17.
123. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. at 1631.
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Title VII.124  This type of favoritism occurs when an employee is 
“coerced into submitting to unwelcome sexual advances in return for a 
job benefit.”125  As a result, other co-workers who were qualified for but 
did not receive the benefit may be able to establish that the sexual 
relationship was generally made a condition for receiving the benefit.126 
Evidence of such a precondition may support a claim of a hostile work 
environment in violation of Title VII.127 
For example, in Toscano v. Nimmo, a Delaware court found a Title VII 
violation where the granting of sexual favors was a condition for 
promotion.128  A female employee alleged that her application for a 
particular position in the hospital was denied due to unlawful 
discrimination because the promotion was granted to a co-worker who was 
having a consensual sexual affair with the supervisor.129  The plaintiff 
claimed that the co-worker’s affair with the supervisor won the co-worker 
preferential treatment and promotion.130   
In rendering its decision, the court considered evidence of sexually 
suggestive telephone calls made by the supervisor to female employees at 
their home telephone numbers, descriptions of the supervisor’s alleged 
“sexual encounters” with subordinate female employees, and the 
supervisor’s exhibition of “suggestive behavior at work.”131  The court 
stated that the supervisor failed to keep his work and private life separate 
and that the promotion of an employee who had granted him sexual favors 
was consistent with his documented behaviors.  After the complaint was 
filed charging that the promotion was based on favoritism, the supervisor 
made harassing telephone calls to plaintiff’s work and home numbers 
asking her to stop complaining about his relationship with the co-worker.132  
Further, the court established that the supervisor withheld from the plaintiff 
information that she needed to work effectively, that he changed her typical 
job assignments, and that as a result she was transferred to a lower rank 
position.133 
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that her co-worker 
entered into the affair to obtain the promotion.  The court further held that 
sexual favors played a role in promotion selection, that the plaintiff was 
better qualified for the position, and that the supervisor harassed the 
124. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1204.
129. Id. at 1198.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1200.
132. Id. at 1205.
133. Id. at 1206.
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plaintiff.134  This, in the court’s view, violated the plaintiff’s Title VII 
rights because the sexual favors appeared to aid the co-worker in receiving 
a promotion, even if, as the court found, the affair was consensual.135  
Toscano thus demonstrates that a third party may bring a claim and prevail 
against the employer under Title VII when the employer is engaged in a 
sexual relationship with a co-worker where sexual favoritism is the basis 
for awarding the co-worker a promotion.136  
3. Widespread Favoritism Affecting Third Parties
According to EEOC Policy Guidance and case law, if favoritism based
upon sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, employees who do not 
welcome this conduct can bring a hostile environment claim.137  A party 
may file a lawsuit without being a direct target of sexual conduct, and 
without deciding whether those who received favorable treatment willfully 
provided the sexual favors.138   
In Broderick v. Ruder, a female employee filed a Title VII claim 
against the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) after five years 
of employment with the agency.139  The plaintiff, an attorney in the 
Enforcement Division, worked at various times for five different 
supervisors.140  During the entire period, she received only one promotion, 
even though she was eligible for two more due to her length of service.141  
During the trial, the plaintiff testified that persons in managerial positions 
caused an “atmosphere of sexual harassment[,]” which other witnesses 
corroborated.142   
In one example of that atmosphere, the plaintiff testified about 
supervisor conduct.  She stated that during her first week on the job, the 
company Brand Chief repeatedly asked her to accept his offer for a ride 
home, and another superior kissed her at a company party.143  However, 
134. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1200–04.
135. Id.
136. Id.  See also Mitchell Poole, Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair,
but is There Liability, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 834–35 (1998).
137. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
138. Id.  See Mary Kate Sheridan, Just Because It’s Sex Doesn’t Mean It’s Because of Sex:
The Need for New Legislation to Target Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS.
379 (2007).
139. See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1270 (where the Plaintiff asserted that defendant,
chairman of SEC, was responsible for creating and refusing to remedy a sexually hostile
work environment at the regional SEC office, and that plaintiff’s supervisors retaliated
against her for opposing the actions of her managers that she considered to be illegal under
Title VII.).
140. Id.
141. Id. (stating that during the Plaintiff’s employment at the SEC’s Enforcement Division
she received one promotion to grade 13, step 1.  However, due to the length of her service,
the plaintiff met eligibility qualifications for promotion to grades 14 and 15.).
142. Id. at 1272.
143. Id.
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other relevant incidents that occurred during that period were not 
personally directed at the plaintiff and were not quid pro quo exchange of 
sexual favors for job benefits.144   
The court disregarded her superiors’ direct approaches, and instead 
held that the sexually hostile work environment was created by other events 
that happened during plaintiff’s employment.145  On one occasion, a male 
Regional Administrator, intoxicated at a work party, untied plaintiff’s 
sweater, kissed the plaintiff, and kissed another female employee.146  At 
another work-related occasion, the same Regional Administrator put his 
hands on the hips of an administrative assistant and made a comment that 
she had “sexy, wide hips.”147  Additionally, the plaintiff attested that the 
Regional Assistant and Regional Trial Counsel made sexually themed 
comments regarding her dress and body.148  
The second example of an atmosphere of sexual harassment included a 
married male Branch Chief who admitted to having an affair with his female 
secretary from December 1981 to June 1984; this affair was known around 
the department.149  During the time of the affair, his secretary paramour was 
promoted three times, received an acclamation, and two cash awards.150  The 
Branch Chief noted that although he was not the secretary’s supervisor, he 
provided “direct input” into her performance evaluations.151 Despite his 
conduct, the Branch Chief was never disciplined and had his salary increased 
ten times between October 1983 and January 1987.152  
A third example of the atmosphere of sexual harassment involved a male 
Assistant Regional Administrator (“ARA”) for the Enforcement Division and 
his subordinate female employee.  Although there was no direct evidence that 
the two were engaged in a sexual relationship, the plaintiff presented evidence 
showing that ARA was “noticeably attracted” to his subordinate female 
employee.  Further, evidence was presented that both ARA and the subordinate 
spent time socializing at and outside of the workplace during business hours.  It 
was undisputed that during a period of just over two years, the ARA 
significantly advanced the subordinate’s career.153    
Finally, the plaintiff supported her claim by presenting “compelling 
evidence” of a sexual relationship between the ARA for the Regulation 
Division (“ARA-RD”) and his female associate.154  Witnesses testified that 
144. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1274.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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the ARA-RD and the associate socialized together by having extended 
lunches, going out for dinner and drinks, and were seen jogging as a pair.155  
During a National Secretaries Week luncheon, the female associate became 
inebriated and the ARA-RD helped her by accompanying her home.156  The 
ARA-RD also traveled on a business trip with his female associate and the 
two shared a hotel room.157  During the time of her employment, the female 
associate quickly advanced with the assistance of the ARA-RD.  The 
associate was promoted twice over the period of a year, received a $300 
award, and was highly reviewed with perfect marks in her employee 
evaluation.158  
The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial established 
“conduct of a sexual nature was so pervasive” at the department that it 
created “a hostile or offensive work environment which affected the 
motivation and work performance of those who found such conduct 
repugnant and offensive.”159  The court stated that the plaintiff was 
obligated to work in a setting where managers, by their actions, mistreated 
her and other female staff members when they showed favoritism towards 
other women who engaged in sexual conduct with them.160  The plaintiff 
was negatively affected by the favoritism at her workplace, which lowered 
her motivation and affected her job performance, taking away opportunities 
for career advancement from her and other female staff members.161  The 
case presented to the court distinctly showed that the plaintiff and other 
female coworkers felt the “sexual conduct and its accompanying 
manifestations . . . to be offensive.”162  
Miller v. Department of Corrections provides another example where a 
court held that a superior who showed favoritism towards his subordinate 
employees created a hostile work environment.163  Two former employees 
at the California Valley State Prison for Women, Miller and Mackey, filed 
a sexual harassment lawsuit164 alleging that their superior, Kuykendall, who 
155. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1274–75 (noting that in this circumstance the ARA denied the occurrence of
inappropriate sexual behavior and stated that the time was spent discussing female
employee’s personal life issues and “theological problems.”).
158. Id. at 1275.
159. Id. at 1278.
160. Id.
161. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278.
162. Id. (noting that “plaintiff and other women were for obvious reasons reluctant to
voice their displeasure and, when they did, they were treated with a hostile response by . . .
the management team.”).
163. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 446.
164. Id. at 450 (noting that the FEHA expressly prohibits sexual harassment in the
workplace. Under FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to harass an
employee because of sex.).  See Cal. Gov’t Code §12940(j)(1)-(4)(C) (West 2015) (noting that
under FEHA, sexual harassment of an employee by another employee, “other than an agent or
supervisor, shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have
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was a chief deputy warden of the prison, showed favoritism towards female 
employees who had sexual relationships with him.165  
Testimony showed that, in 1994, Miller overheard from other employees 
that Kuykendall was having sexual relationship with three different female 
subordinates: Patrick, Brown, and Bibb.166  During the time of these 
relationships, all three received job benefits, including transfers, promotions, 
special assignments, and other work privileges.  Moreover, the women 
bragged to co-workers about their power to control the warden and their 
enjoyment of the additional benefits he bestowed upon them.   
For instance, Miller was on a committee that assessed Bibb’s 
application for a promotion.  Kuykendall conceded that he had sexual 
relations with Bibb, which was corroborated by other witnesses.167  If 
granted, the promotion would have transferred Bibb from a different 
facility to a position that was under Kuykendall’s direct supervision.168  
After Bibb’s application for promotion was denied, Miller and other 
committee members were informed that Kuykendall ordered them to grant 
Bibb the promotion.169  As a result, Bibb was awarded the promotion and 
known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  The 
term “‘harassment’ . . . includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based 
on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”). 
165. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 450.
166. Id. at 452 (Kuykendall was having sexual affairs with his secretary (Bibb),
subordinate associate warden (Patrick), and department employee (Brown).).  See id. at 455
(“Plaintiffs presented evidence that the three women who were having sexual affairs with
Kuykendall—Patrick, Bibb, and Brown—squabbled over him, sometimes in emotional
scenes witnessed by other employees, including Miller.”).  See also id. at 458 (One
correctional employee commented on his wife’s difficulties with the employment conditions
at her department:  “the sexual relationships Kuykendall was having with Bibb and Brown”
were creating an “impossible environment” for his wife to work in.).
167. Id. at 454–55.  (“Kuykendall conceded he had danced with Bibb at work-related
social gatherings and there was evidence that he telephoned her at home hundreds of times
from his workplace. Employees, including Mackey and Miller, witnessed Bibb and
Kuykendall fondling each other on at least three occasions at work-related social gatherings
occurring between 1991 and 1998 where employees of the institution were present. One
Department employee, Phyllis Mellott, also complained that at such a gathering Kuykendall
had put his arms around her and another employee and made unwelcome groping gestures.
Kuykendall was present with Bibb in 1998 when she was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol, a circumstance of which Miller and other employees were aware.
Kuykendall failed to initiate an internal affairs investigation concerning the incident or
report his own involvement.”)
168. Id. at 452.
169. Id. at 452–453 (“When the interviewing panel did not select Bibb, Miller and other
members of the panel were informed by an associate warden that Kuykendall wanted them
to ‘make it happen.’”  Miller declared: “This was . . . the first of many incidents which
caused me to lose faith in the system . . . and to feel somewhat powerless because of
Kuykendall and his sexual relations with subordinates.”  Further, “there was evidence Bibb
had bragged to plaintiff Mackey of her power over the warden, and a departmental internal
affairs investigation later concluded that Kuykendall’s personal relationship with Bibb
rendered his involvement in her promotion unethical.”).
 Summer 2015] MITIGATING THE EMPLOYER’S EXPOSURE 341 
transfer.  In addition, Patrick was also awarded a transfer to the facility 
where Kuykendall was a warden and “enjoyed unusual privileges such as 
having to report directly to Kuykendall rather than to her immediate 
superior.”170  
In another occurrence, Brown won promotions over other employees 
due to her romantic relationship with Kuykendall.171  In 1995, both Brown 
and the plaintiff Miller applied for a temporary job as facility captain. 
Brown announced to Miller that she had an advantage over Miller and 
would receive the job.172  Kuykendall served on the interview panel and 
granted Brown the promotion, “despite Miller’s higher rank, superior 
education, and greater experience.”173  Brown’s promotion surprised other 
employees and officers involved in the selection process because they had 
recommended Miller: They have referred to Brown’s selection as 
“unfair.”174 
Later, when Miller and Brown competed for promotion to a permanent 
facility position, and Brown again received the promotion.175  Within a year 
and a half, Brown was promoted to the position of associate warden, two 
ranks above entry level.176  Kuykendall was on the interview panel during 
the selection process.177  The speed of Brown’s promotions within the ranks 
was “unusually rapid” and viewed negatively by other employees.178   
Employees who attempted to rectify favoritism by reporting the sexual 
affairs were punished or subjected to an abusive work environment.  For 
instance, plaintiff Mackey worked as a records manager and received 
170. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 453.
171. Id. (Brown admitted to having an affair with Kuykendall after Miller confronted
her.).  See also id. at 457 (Plaintiff Mackey was aware of Kuykendall’s sexual affairs with
Bibb and Brown.).
172. Id. 4th at 467 (stating that Brown announced to Miller that Kuykendall would be
forced to give her, Brown, the promotion or she would “take him down” with her
knowledge of “every scar on his body.”).
173. Id. at 453–54 (noting that the Departmental Internal Affairs investigation report “later
called Kuykendall’s conduct unethical because of his sexual relationship with Brown.”
Further, the internal affairs report noted that, as to Bibb and Brown, “[b]oth relationships
were viewed by staff as unethical from a business practice standpoint and one [sic] that
created a hostile working environment.”  During his investigation, the internal affairs
investigator “encountered several employees who believed that persons who had sexual
affairs with Kuykendall received special employment benefits.”).
174. Id. at 454 (stating that employees attributed Brown’s promotion to her sexual affair
with Kuykendall and believed that Brown was unqualified for the position); see also id. at
458 (stating that “Mackey was certain that Brown was promoted to the position of associate
warden not because of merit, but because of her sexual affair with Kuykendall.”).
175. Id.
176. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 454.
177. Id.
178. Id.  (noting that other employees were outraged at the pace of Brown’s promotions
and complained that to achieve higher-ranking positions they would have to “F [their] way
to the top.”).
 342 HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:2 
inmate pay, which was comprised of enhanced salary benefits.179  After 
Mackey complained to Kuykendall about his sexual relations with Brown, 
Mackey’s supplemental pay was withdrawn and she was subjected to 
demeaning humiliation and verbal abuse in front of the coworkers.180  
Mackey testified that her job responsibilities changed after she complained 
to an internal affairs investigator that she was denied opportunities for 
promotion.181  She further testified that she was eventually forced to 
resign182 and that she believed she was not promoted because she did not 
have sex with Kuykendall.183  
Similarly, plaintiff Miller’s working environment became intolerable 
after she complained of sexual affairs between Kuykendall and his 
subordinates.184  This was evidenced in the reduction of Miller’s 
supervisory responsibilities, imposition of additional duties, added criticism 
of her performance, cancellation of accommodations that Miller had been 
granted for her physical conditions, interference with her work, and the 
physical assault and false imprisonment of Miller by Brown.185  
In light of these facts, the court concluded that widespread sexual 
favoritism existed at the correctional facility and caused a hostile working 
environment for its employees.186  The court referenced the evidence of 
widespread favoritism, which included “admissions by the participants 
179. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 458.
180. Id. (noting that “Mackey claimed Brown demeaned her in the presence of other
employees and impeded the execution of Mackey’s duties in various respects, and stating
that ‘[t]his situation created hostility among the employees in [Mackey’s] Department.’”).
Brown repeatedly interrogated Mackey about her statements to the internal affairs
investigator and attempted to contact Mackey outside of work.  Stress led to health
problems, and as a result, Mackey was unable to work between August 1998 and January
1999.  Upon her return to work, Mackey was demoted and suffered further mistreatment and
humiliation.  Id. at 459.
181. Id.
182. Id. (noting that “Kuykendall subsequently reduced [Mackey’s] responsibilities and
denied her access to the work experience she needed in order to be promoted to the position
of correctional counselor”); see id. (noting that “[a] few months later she resigned, finding
the conditions of employment intolerable.”).
183. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 459.
184. Id. at 455 (stating that according to Miller, after she complained to Kuykendall, chief
deputy warden Yamamoto and Brown made criticisms of her work, and threatened her with
reprisals when she complained to Kuykendall about their interference).
185. Id. at 455–57.
186. Id. at 470–71 (“There was evidence of considerable flaunting of the relationships
affecting the workplace, consisting of Bibb and Brown’s bragging and the jealous scenes
between these two women, along with Kuykendall’s indiscreet behavior at a number of
work-related social gatherings.  The favoritism that ensued from the sexual affairs also was
on public display, reflected in Kuykendall’s permitting Brown to abuse plaintiffs, his
directive to the interview committee to promote Bibb, and his repeated admissions that he
would not or could not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with her.  It may
even be inferred that Kuykendall solicited sexual favors in return for employment benefits,
in light of Bibb and Brown’s boasts, the sequence of promotions awarded by Kuykendall,
and his comment to Miller, ‘I should have chose[n] you.’”)
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concerning the nature of the relationships, boasting by the favored women, 
eyewitness accounts of incidents of public fondling, repeated promotion 
despite lack of qualifications, and Kuykendall’s admission [that] he could 
not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with her . . .”187 
Both Broderick and Miller suggest that to establish a hostile 
environment claim as a violation of Title VII, favoritism in the workplace 
must be widespread, based on sexual favors, and directed toward 
employees who do not welcome this conduct.  These cases suggest that 
widespread favoritism exists when conduct of a sexual nature is so 
pervasive as to affect the motivation and work performance of employees, 
where evidence of public displays of affections is present, and where 
promotions are awarded for sexual favors.   
B. TRADITIONAL THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT THEORIES
Third-party sexual harassment involves a situation where the plaintiff
is not a direct target of the harassment but is subjected to a work 
atmosphere where such harassment, even if directed towards others, is 
severe or pervasive.188  The plaintiff’s employment conditions may be 
affected even if the conduct is not extreme, is welcomed by participants, 
and is not directed toward the plaintiff.  Such a situation could involve a 
work environment where employees engage in sexual joking or banter that 
may prove offensive to parties who witness the conversation.189    
Just because some employees in the workplace do not find the specific 
conduct objectionable does not insulate the employer from potential liability to 
an individual employee who is reasonably offended by the conduct.190  For 
instance, in McLaughlin v. Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, a male 
employee’s statements that a female co-worker wanted to be a veterinarian 
because she was “into dogs” and “screwing animals” supported a viable hostile 
187. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 471.
188. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (noting that “[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”).
189. See, e.g., Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 359 (7th Cir. 2002) overruled on
other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Even if we assume that
[plaintiff’s] tawdry conduct did not amount to Title VII sexual harassment, [defendant] was
still permitted to terminate her.  In fact, the company’s failure to do so would have most
likely constituted a Title VII violation . . . , as well as subjecting the company to future
liability if another complaint of harassment was filed against [plaintiff].”)
190. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 854–57 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Plaintiff’s discrimination claim alleges that her conditions of employment were
impermissibly harmed by the open [and consensual] sexual relationship, between her
supervisor and one of her co-workers, which created a hostile and sexually-charged work
environment from which she suffered because of her sex.”).
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environment claim.191  Additionally, the display or dissemination of sexual 
visual materials in the workplace may create a hostile work environment.192   
Liability may exist where an employer is aware or should be aware of the 
hostile work environment caused by a non-supervisor employee.193  Such 
knowledge of a hostile work environment may exist where a supervisor or an 
employer’s agent observes or learns of the prohibited behavior.194  However, 
lack of direct notification regarding hostile work environment does not 
mitigate liability.195  Where employees and supervisors are aware of the 
harassment, it can be expected that the employer should have had knowledge 
of the conduct.196    
Conduct not specifically directed toward the offended employee can 
have the same consequence as if it was addressed to that person.197  Courts 
also consider evidence of other acts of harassment of which a plaintiff 
becomes aware during the period of his or her employment, even if the 
other acts were directed at someone other than the plaintiff and did not 
happen in the plaintiff’s presence.198 
A third-party employee may also have a retaliation claim of action 
against an employer if the plaintiff complained about an interoffice 
romance to the employer and the employer took adverse action against the 
employee.199  For instance, in Reginelli v. Motion Industries, Inc., the 
plaintiff was awarded $953,214 in damages for wrongful termination when 
he was fired after reporting a reasonably suspicious sexual relationship 
between a male supervisor and a subordinate female employee.200  
C. EMERGING SEX-PLUS THEORY
Proving the occurrence of sexual harassment has long been considered
essential to a successful claim of sexual favoritism.201  This requirement is 
191. See McLaughlin v. Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, 739 F. Supp. 97, 101–
104 (N.D.N.Y 1990).
192. See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821–22 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(noting that although the claim was dismissed on a summary judgment motion, the court
sympathized with the plaintiff because “it appeared” that the plaintiff “worked in a sexually
tinged environment that is wholly inappropriate in modern-day workplaces.”).
193. BRUCE HARRISON, ET AL., SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, 1-25 EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK
§ 25.02(2)(c)(ii) (2008); Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 854; Rhodes, 243 F. Supp. at 820; Fleenor
v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. Ohio 1996).
194. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(c)(ii); Fleenor, 81 F.3d at 50.
195. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (1986) (stating that an “absence of notice to an
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability”).
196. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(c)(ii).
197. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(a)(i).
198. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2008).
199. Reginelli v. Motion Indus., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (1997).
200. Id.
201. EEOC NOTICE N-915.048, supra note 102 (noting that to bring a claim of sexual
favoritism, the plaintiff must provide evidence of either quid pro quo sexual harassment or a
hostile work environment based on sexual harassment).
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a high hurdle for a plaintiff, because claims are often based on isolated 
instances of inappropriate behavior that, because they do not represent a 
pattern of behavior, have been associated with consensual sexual 
relationships rather than harassment.202  Consequently, courts have 
generally precluded recourse on a theory of sexual favoritism, and instead 
burdened plaintiffs with the extremely high standard of proving that they 
were denied employment rights because of a sexually charged hostile work 
environment that was simultaneously damaging to other employees.203   
A “sex-plus” theory offers plaintiffs an alternative.  Under the sex-plus 
theory, a plaintiff (usually a woman) must show that she was discriminated 
against because of her gender in conjunction with a second characteristic.204  
Examples of bases for sex-plus claims include discrimination based on sex 
plus a personal relationship,205 sex plus marital status,206 sex plus 
fertility,207 sex plus pregnancy,208 sex plus children,209 and sex plus gender 
stereotypes.210  Under this theory, there is no need to establish the existence 
of a hostile work environment. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that when sex is considered in 
conjunction with a second characteristic, the sex-plus theory allows 
additional narrowly defined groups to assert claims that would not 
otherwise be protected by Title VII.211  This sex-plus concept was applied 
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., where the defendant refused to hire 
women who had children in pre-school but not men who had children in 
pre-school.212  The Supreme Court found no general bias against women by 
the defendant, specifically pointing to evidence that more than seventy-five 
percent of open positions had been filled by women.213  The Court held that 
the usage of different criteria for hiring men and women for the same job 
nonetheless violated Title VII.214   
Under a sex-plus theory, “the threshold question for sexual favoritism 
would not be whether an individual consented to or was coerced into a sexual 
202. See Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(stating that “[a]lleged favoritism to a paramour generally has been held not to constitute
discrimination in violation of Title VII because the alleged discrimination is not based on
the plaintiff’s gender.”).
203. See Perry v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
workplace must be “hellish” to be actionable).
204. Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
205. Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997). 
206. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
207. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
208. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983).
209. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
210. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
211. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 542.
212. Id. at 543.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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relationship . . . but were gender and a sexual relationship the motivating factor 
in the employer’s decision to promote one employee over the other?”215   
IV. MITIGATING RISK AND PREVENTING HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENTS
An employer must take affirmative and appropriate action to keep the
workplace from deteriorating into a hostile work environment that 
victimizes employees, damages the company’s performance and reputation, 
and exposes it to lawsuits and large jury awards.  Employers may avoid 
hostile work environments and shield themselves from exposure to legal 
liability by establishing and implementing a proper plan of action, 
preventing unacceptable incidents of employee behavior, and acting in a 
measured and appropriate manner in response to claims of sexual 
harassment or hostile work environment.216  
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment,217 
and employers must initiate preventative measures in an informed way.  To 
prevent sexual harassment from occurring in the workplace and to 
minimize any harm that does occur, employers should inform employees 
about the subject of sexual harassment at the work place; express strong 
and absolute disapproval, establish work policies to address sexual 
harassment issues that accurately comply with the law; implement 
appropriate sanctions for breach of policies; and develop methods to 
sensitize all employees, including supervisors, managers, and officers, to 
sexual harassment issues.218  The impact of sexual harassment on third 
parties requires special attention.  It is important that all employees are 
aware that disruptive behavior in the workplace damages both the 
individuals directly involved, and other employees who nevertheless 
experience disruption even if not the intended victims of sexual 
harassment, widespread favoritism, or sexual discrimination. 
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the central role and 
importance of an employer’s formal statement of its sexual harassment 
policy.  We will give special attention to two related topics for a company to 
215. See Susan J. Best, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of Action Under a “Sex-Plus” Theory,
30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 211, 232 (2009).  See also Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (declaring sex-plus
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII).
216. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2004).
217. Id.
218. Id.  See C. M. Hunt, et al., supra note 15, at 661 (stating that organizations should
implement policies that are “based on empowerment, encouraging the resistance of sexual
harassment through the formal support of victims and the unconditional punishment of
perpetrators.”); Ashby Jones & Nathan Koppel, Plenty of Company: Lapses Felled A Long
List Of Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2010, at A.10 (noting that “Steven J. Heyer was
ousted as chief executive of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. in 2007, after the
board of directors received an anonymous letter accusing him of creating a hostile work
environment. The letter alleged that Mr. Heyer made inappropriate physical contact with a
female employee outside a restaurant bathroom, on at least one occasion.”).
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consider in developing its complaint procedure and in preparing to conduct 
internal investigations of formal charges of a hostile work environment. 
A. POLICY STATEMENT
A policy statement is the cornerstone of an employer’s efforts to
prevent sexual harassment at the workplace.219  This written document puts 
all employees on notice that the employer actively seeks to identify and 
eliminate all instances of workplace sexual harassment.220  The EEOC 
suggests that an effective complaint procedure “encourage[s] employees to 
report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive.”221  If an 
employee promptly utilizes the procedure, the employer can usually stop 
harassment before actionable harm occurs.222  A carefully formulated and 
implemented sexual harassment policy statement helps provide a necessary 
defense against claims for liability and punitive damages in the event that 
harassment occurs.223  The absence of antiharassment policies will make it 
difficult for an employer to prove in any litigation that it exercised 
reasonable care to prevent or correct the harassment.224   
A general policy pledging a nondiscriminatory workplace is 
insufficient to satisfy the expectation of an employer’s reasonable care.  To 
minimize liability and provide meaningful protection for employees, 
employers should have a sexual harassment policy in place that includes 
five elements: a clear policy statement, an effective complaint procedure, 
an effective policy distribution plan, education and training for all 
employees, and a system for timely investigations and corrective action.   
A company’s policy statement on sexual harassment must include a 
bold and direct statement of the company’s intolerance and prohibition of 
any form of sexual harassment.  In addition, a company’s sexual 
harassment statement must be clear, emphatic, easily understood, free of 
219. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (noting that “Title
VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms.”).
220. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, EEOC NOTICE NO.
915.002 (Jun. 18, 1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html
(hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE 915.002”).
221. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764.
222. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (“this case
demonstrates why, as a practical matter, inappropriate sexual conduct will virtually never
rise to the level of actionability when an employer takes . . . prompt remedial action”).
223. See Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (noting that in the context of punitive
damages, it is insufficient to show that certain individuals have exhibited the malice or
reckless indifference required under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  The plaintiff-employee
must impute liability for punitive damages to the employer under the principles of agency
law, and an employer may not be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment
decisions of managerial agents where those decisions are contrary to the employer’s good-
faith efforts to comply with Title VII.).
224. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
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confusing legal terms, and provide examples of conduct targeted for 
immediate elimination.  There should be a full description of behaviors that 
are covered by the sexual harassment label and a substantial list of specific 
behaviors that are prohibited.  At the same time, the policy should state that 
the list is only a representative, and not exhaustive, sample of all possible 
violations.225   
Since liability for harassment may occur outside of work or regular 
working hours, employers should extend the policy to include employee 
activities that are conducted via social media, email, and the Internet, and 
provide guidelines to shape employee activity therein, which may create a 
hostile work environment.226  The inclusion of social media and Internet 
policy into this statement is important, since forty-three percent of surveyed 
employees believe that receiving unsolicited and sexually explicit email 
can be severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment and 
constitute sexual harassment.227 
225. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (suggesting that “[t]he policy and complaint
procedure should be written in a way that will be understood by all employees in the
employer’s workforce. Other measures to ensure effective dissemination of the policy and
complaint procedure include posting them in central locations and incorporating them into
employee handbooks.  If feasible, the employer should provide training to all employees to
ensure that they understand their rights and responsibilities.  An anti-harassment policy and
complaint procedure should contain, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) A clear
explanation of prohibited conduct;  (2) Assurance that employees who make complaints of
harassment or provide information related to such complaints will be protected against
retaliation;  (3) A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of
complaint;  (4) Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment
complaints to the extent possible;  (5) A complaint process that provides a prompt,
thorough, and impartial investigation; and (6) Assurance that the employer will take
immediate and appropriate corrective action when it determines that harassment has
occurred.”).  See also Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that “[t]he policy (1) provides a definition of sexual harassment, (2) identifies whom
employees should contact if they are subjected to sexual harassment, (3) describes the
disciplinary measures that the company may use in a harassment case, and (4) provides a
statement that retaliation will not be tolerated.”).
226. Tamara E. Russell, Employment Law Meets Social Media: Advice for Employers,
BNA – HR FOCUS (Oct. 2011), http://www.uslawwatch.com/2011/08/16/privacy/bna-
insights-employmentlabor-law-meets-social-media-advice-employers/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2015).  See Nelson & Simek, supra note 69, at HT 11 (stating that a policy should instruct
employees to “avoid controversial subjects, use a polite and respectful tone, even when
disagreeing, [and] never post anything that could conceivably be construed as
discrimination, harassment, or defamation.”  The author also suggests that “[a] well-crafted
policy should: (1) Address all potential pitfalls in a clear and organization-specific manner
and be consistent with the other organization policies and procedures; (2) Distinguish
between business and personal use (on-the-job and off-the-job conduct); (3) Inform
employees of the rules and regulations that state they will have a reduced or non-existent
expectation of privacy on any of the organization-provided computers, e-mail systems,
mobile devices, and telephone or voice systems; and (4) Encompass what can be said, who
can say it, and the manner in which things should be said.”)
227. See Ben Dahl, A Further Darkside to Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail? An
Assessment of Potential Employer Liability for Spam E-Mail, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 179, 192 (2003).
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The mere publication of a sexual harassment policy will not insulate 
the employer from liability.228  To put employees properly on notice, the 
policy should be clearly communicated to employees and discussed with 
supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel.229   To be optimally effective, 
any sexual harassment policy should be distributed in writing, to all 
employees, on multiple occasions, with an acknowledgement from each 
employee that the policy was received, read, and understood.230  An 
employee’s written acknowledgement of her receipt of the policy and 
knowledge of its contents are helpful to rebut harassment claims against the 
employer.231  
Furthermore, both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees need to 
be educated, trained, and reminded about the company’s workplace sexual 
harassment policy.  Even when an employee receives a copy of the sexual 
harassment policy when first hired, subsequent training sessions are 
important to ensure that employees remain aware of the details of the 
policy and their roles in preventing and reporting claims.  
B. COMPLAINT PROCEDURE
A policy statement may be more effective if employees feel minimally
intimidated when reporting violations.232  The policy statement must 
228. Harbison v. Pilot Air Freight, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024, *76 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16,
2001) (quoting Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 2000) (“although
the implementation of a written or formal antidiscrimination policy is relevant to evaluating
an employer’s good faith efforts at Title VII compliance, it is not sufficient in and of itself to
insulate an employer from a punitive damages award.”)); see Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Ellerth and Faragher do not, as the defendants
seem to assume, focus mechanically on the formal existence of a sexual harassment policy,
allowing an absolute defense to a hostile work environment claim whenever the employer
can point to an anti-harassment policy of some sort.”).
229. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (stating that “[a]n employer should provide
every employee with a copy of the policy and complaint procedure, and redistribute it
periodically.”).
230. John A. Pearce II & Samuel A. DiLullo, A Business Policy Statement Model for
Eliminating Sexual Harassment and Related Employer Liability, 66 S.A.M. ADVANCED
MGMT. J. 12–21 (2001) (stating that distribution should take place at the time of initial
hiring, with subsequent distributions thereafter.  Employee handbooks, annual performance
reviews, periodic training sessions, company newsletters, and manuals all provide
opportunities to redistribute the policy to ensure awareness by all employees.  Permanent
and prominent placement of the harassment policy on a bulletin board and the company
computer network can also be effective.  In addition, employers should appoint
knowledgeable individuals generally available in a confidential setting to respond to
employee questions concerning the policy.  Since some employees may not speak and read
English well, the policy should be written in as many languages as will be sufficient to
ensure the comprehension of all employees.).
231. Id. (suggesting that after it is signed and detached from the employee’s copy of the
policy statement, the written notice pertaining to the sexual harassment policy should be
kept as part of each person’s permanent personnel file).
232. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (noting that “[a]n employer’s harassment
complaint procedure should be designed to encourage victims to come forward.”).
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explain the complaint process.233  A written procedure for reporting 
incidents of harassment should do the following: (1) specify the steps to 
take to initiate a harassment complaint; (2) refrain from requiring an 
alleged victim to first bring the complaint to the offending supervisor; (3) 
encourage the alleged victim to confront the offending person; (4) prohibit 
retaliation against anyone reporting sexual harassment; (5) encourage 
employees to report all occurrences of harassment; (6) and promote 
confidentiality.  It is also crucial that the employer’s antiharassment policy 
and complaint procedure contain information pertaining to the timeframe 
for filing charges of unlawful harassment with the EEOC or state fair 
employment practice agencies.234  
In addition, the sexual harassment policy should ensure that there are 
no unreasonable obstacles to filing a complaint.235  To the contrary, 
employers should encourage employees to report all occurrences. 
Employees must be provided with multiple convenient outlets through 
which to submit complaints.  What might initially appear to be an isolated 
incident to an employee could actually be a part of a pattern of conduct for 
which an employer may be found liable.  A single incident, when combined 
with other seemingly harmless incidents or factors, may also rise to the 
level of severity and pervasiveness necessary to make a claim actionable.  
Moreover, policies requiring claimants to report alleged harassment to 
an immediate supervisor are ineffective because the supervisor himself may 
be the culprit.236  Although the sexual harassment policy should require 
supervisors to report complaints of harassment to appropriate officials,237 
233. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (suggesting, “[a] complaint procedure should
not be rigid, since that could defeat the goal of preventing and correcting harassment.”).
234. Id. (suggesting that the policy must explain that the deadline runs from the last date of
unlawful harassment, not from the date the complaint is resolved).  See Currier v. Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that an
employer’s affirmatively misleading statements pertaining to the resolution of the grievance
in the employee’s favor can establish an equitable estoppel claim and thus allow the plaintiff
to file the complaint after the statute of limitations has run); Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the tolling of
statutory time for filing a complaint is allowed where plaintiff was misled by the employer
to believe that discriminatory treatment would be resolved); Miller v. Beneficial
Management Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 845 (3d Cir. N.J. 1992) (stating that equitable tolling
applies where employer’s own acts or omissions lured the plaintiff into foregoing a prompt
attempt to vindicate his rights).
235. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
236. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (U.S. 1998) (noting that the
City of Boca Raton’s policy “did not include any assurance that the harassing supervisors
could be bypassed in registering complaints.”).
237. Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1998) (complaint
procedure was deficient because it only required supervisors to report “formal” as opposed
to “informal” complaints of harassment); Varner v. National Super Markets Inc., 94 F.3d
1209, 1214 (8th Cir. Mo. 1996) (complaint procedure was not effective if it did not require
supervisor with knowledge of harassment to report the information to those in position to
take appropriate action).
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the EEOC suggests that an employer designate at least one official outside 
the employee’s chain of command to hear complaints of harassment.238 
Antiharassment policies and complaint procedures must also state that 
employees are protected from retaliation for reporting harassment or 
providing information relating to such complaints.239  Without assurance 
against retaliation, an antiharassment policy or a complaint procedure can 
be rendered ineffective.240  An employer creates legal and financial 
exposure by failing to shield employees against negative retaliation.241  
Therefore, the employer must safeguard employees against retaliation from 
its supervisors.242   
Finally, the employer should make explicitly clear to employees that it 
will protect the confidentiality of harassment allegations to any extent 
possible, and deal with any reports in a confidential, need-to-know 
manner.243  The employer should also disclose that complete confidentiality 
cannot always be guaranteed because the employer’s duty to investigate 
presumes sharing and disclosing information with the alleged harasser, 
witnesses, and others who may become involved.244  
238. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“For example, if the employer has an office
of human resources, one or more officials in that office could be authorized to take
complaints. Allowing an employee to bypass his or her chain of command provides
additional assurance that the complaint will be handled in an impartial manner, since an
employee who reports harassment by his or her supervisor may feel that officials within the
chain of command will more readily believe the supervisor’s version of events.”).
239. Id.
240. Id.  Surveys have shown that a common reason for failure to report harassment to
management is fear of retaliation.  See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn’t
She Just Report Him?  The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to
Sexual Harassment, 51 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 122–23 (1995) (citing studies that have shown
that a significant proportion of harassment victims are worse off after complaining).
241. See, e.g., The Associated Press, State Pays Fired KDHR Employee $510,000, THE 
TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL, Mar. 29, 1999, available at http://cjonline.com/stories/032899
/kan_kdhrpayment.shtml.
In March 1998, the court upheld a jury award to a former employee of the 
Kansas Department of Human Resources for $300,000.  Legal fees and interest 
brought the total to $510,000.  The victim claimed that she had been 
unlawfully terminated as retaliation for filing a sexual harassment complaint. 
She alleged her manager had subjected her to sexual harassment for a number 
of years, including such actions as repeatedly asking her for sex, groping her in 
the office, and asking to take nude pictures of her.  Other managers lobbied her 
not to file a lawsuit but to let the matter drop, which would be more favorable 
to her job position.  She agreed not to sue, but after the deadline for filing suit 
expired, she was fired for deficiencies in her work. 
Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230, at 17. 
242. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“For example, when management
investigates a complaint of harassment, the official who interviews the parties and witnesses
should remind these individuals about the prohibition against retaliation.  Management also
should scrutinize employment decisions affecting the complainant and witnesses during and
after the investigation to ensure that such decisions are not based on retaliatory motives.”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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C. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
If an employee complains to management about alleged sexual
harassment, widespread favoritism, or sexual discrimination, the employer 
is obligated to investigate the allegation.245  An employer can shield itself 
from liability by acting reasonably in response to a claim of sexual 
harassment.246  Different approaches exist to handling claims and the 
employer has latitude in deciding what strategies to implement in response 
to sexual harassment claims.247  As a result, courts have focused on 
employers’ actions to resolve sexual harassment claims, instead of applying 
a checklist of proper actions.248  
EEOC guidelines provide that an employer must take “prompt 
remedial action” reasonably calculated to end sexual harassment.249 Once 
an employer becomes aware of sexual harassment, the guidelines 
establish a duty for the employer to investigate.  To defend against a 
subsequent claim of a hostile work environment, an employer must prove 
that they took prompt action to correct harassing behavior.250   
The investigation should involve a representative committee 
including men and women, preferably qualified and trained on 
harassment law and company policy.251   They should possess the 
interviewing and critical analysis skills needed to conduct an 
investigation.  They should also be capable of maintaining objectivity and 
refrain from forming or expressing opinions during the investigation 
process.252  The investigating committee must be sensitive to and 
respectful of the interests of all parties involved, as indicated by 
consideration of such factors as work schedules, language issues, and 
hierarchical relationships. 
245. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“When employee complains to management
about alleged harassment, the employer is obligated to investigate the allegation regardless
of whether it conforms to a particular format or is made in writing.”).
246. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the employer will insulate
itself from Title VII liability if it acts reasonably”).  See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132
F.3d 978, 984 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] good faith investigation of alleged harassment may
satisfy the ‘prompt and adequate’ response standard, even if the investigation turns up no
evidence of harassment . . . [and] a jury later concludes that in fact harassment occurred.”).
247. United States v. New York City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1996).
248. Jayesh Shah, Limiting Expert Testimony About Sexual Harassment Policies, 1999 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 587, 611 (1999).
249. See EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
 250. Justin P. Smith, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace after Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1786, 1794 (1999).
251. See Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230.
252. Id. at 19.  See K. W. Samuels & S. Leung, Harassment-Proofed is Liability-Proofed;
The EEOC and the Supreme Court Clarify Ways Employers Can Limit or Escape Liability
for Supervisory Harassment, 22 NAT. L. J. B9 (1999).
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If a company executive is the focus of the harassment claim, an 
outside independent investigator should be considered.  To avoid charges 
of favoritism, pre-established guidelines for investigations should be 
standard but flexible.   
Because a false claim of harassment can greatly damage the 
reputation of the accused, defamation is another real concern.253  
Everyone involved should be informed of the risks of a defamation claim 
and of the need to keep all information confidential, except as required in 
to resolve the claim.    
V. CONCLUSION
Third-party plaintiffs may have a cause of action based on a hostile 
work environment when sexual harassment unreasonably interferes in the 
workplace; when widespread sexual favoritism contributes to an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; or when employees who 
are not personally harassed lose job benefits to less qualified employees 
who submit to such harassment. 
Historically, courts have been slow to elucidate the legal standards that 
third parties needed to satisfy in order to prevail on sexual harassment 
claims, such as the expectation that plaintiffs provide compelling evidence 
of quid pro quo demands or of a hostile work environment.  However, 
recent decisions are bringing clarity to sexual harassment law, and new 
theories are providing promising options for potential plaintiffs.  In 
particular, because of the viability and increasing public and industry 
awareness of sex-plus theory, both the number of sexual favoritism claims 
and the frequency of positive results for claimants may increase in the 
coming years.  
Employers need to respond to ongoing threats of sexual harassment by 
implementing prevention measures and swiftly investigating employee 
complaints.  Additionally, they need to recognize that some victims of 
sexual harassment can be found among the untargeted co-workers of the 
perpetrator.  Not only do business policies and managerial action need to 
protect these third parties from sexual harassment, but employers must also 
educate employees about their rights and employers’ responsibilities in 
helping to safeguard employees’ working environments.   
253. See Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230 at 19. See also, e.g., Stockley v. AT&T, 687 F.
Supp. 764, 768–69 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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